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The Board of Directors' role in risk oversight has come under increased scrutiny, resulting in shareholder lawsuits, increased regulation, and more extensive disclosure and listing requirements. While theory predicts that Board risk oversight can benefit stakeholders by mitigating risk-related...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013032840
We examine differences in CEO achievement of EPS goals set separately through analyst forecasts and firm bonus plans. Having different goals for the same performance metric enables us to assess their relative importance in incentivizing CEOs. We find CEOs frequently achieve analyst forecasts,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011800636
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We examine whether board and ownership structure variables explain the level of chief executive officer (CEO) compensation. After controlling for standard economic determinants (i.e., the firm's demand for a high-quality CEO, firm performance, and risk), we find that board and ownership...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014222388
This study examines the use of performance-based incentives for internal monitors (general counsel and chief internal auditor) and whether these incentives impair monitors' independence by aligning their interests with the interests of those being monitored. We find evidence that incentives are...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116383
The two major paradigmsin the theoretical agency literature aremoral hazard (i.e., hidden action)and adverseselection (i.e., hiddeninformation). Prior research typically solves these problemsin isolation, as opposed to simultaneouslyincorporating both adverseselection and moral hazard features....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013116385
Corporate governance systems exist to discourage self-interested behavior. One question that is often overlooked is how extensive these systems should be. A look at corporate governance today suggests that self-interest is high because companies are compelled - by regulators and the market - to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013063335
In Closer Look, we highlight significant “holes” in our knowledge of corporate governance. These are central issues where insufficient or inadequate study has left us unable to answer basic questions, and where key assumptions relied upon by experts have not been verified or validated. While...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014359430