where contracts may impose externalities on other agents. The paper derives several properties of the Markov perfect … and monotonic on the contracts. If the grand coalition is not efficient we show that bargaining delays arise in positive …-externality games. Otherwise, if the grand coalition is efficient, there are no bargaining delays and convergence to the grand coalition …

. In particular, it is equivalent to the set of perfectly coalition-proof Nash equilibria (Bernheim, Peleg, and Whinston …

We study the implementability of stable correspondences in marriage markets with externalities. We prove that, contrary … to what happens in markets without externalities, no stable revelation mechanism makes a dominant strategy for the agents …

We study a simple contracting game with a principal and two agents. Contracts exert an externalities on non contractors …

We propose a framework to analyze coalition formation with heterogeneous agents. Existing literature defines stability … conditions that do not ensure that, once an agent decides to sign an agreement, the enlarged coalition is feasible. Defining the … concepts of refraction and exchanging, we set up conditions of existence and enlargement of a coalition with heterogeneous …