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Konyukhovskiy, Pavel V.; Grigoriadis, Theocharis - 2018

Proxy wars are a key pattern of political conflict and interstate competition. Rather than resorting to direct …, but are less costly and render them more immune to exogenous shocks. We start with the modeling of a direct war with two … war where the proposed equilibria are realizable, but not always sustainable in the long run. The consolidation level of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011805757

Optimal Contracts When Enforcement is a Decision Variable

Krasa, Stefan; Villamil, Anne Patricia - 1999

This paper analyzes choice-theoretic costly enforcement in an intertemporal contracting model with a differentially informed investor and entrepreneur. An intertemporal contract is modeled as a mechanism is which there is limited commitment to payment and enforcement decisions. The goal of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014200991

Alliance formation in contests with incomplete information

Metzger, Lars - 2015

This paper studies a contest in which players with unobservable types may form an alliance in a pre-stage of the game to join their forces and compete for a prize. We characterize the pure strategy equilibria of this game of incomplete information. We show that if the formation of an alliance is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010487967

Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

Siemens, Ferdinand von (contributor) - 2005

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002812571

Negotiation and Take-it or Leave-it in Common Agency with Noncontractible Actions

Attar, Andrea; Piaser, Gwenael; Porteiro, Nicolas - 2006

This note presents a counter-example to Theorems 3 and 4 in Peters (2003, J. Eco. Theory) and suggests that indifference of the single agent with respect to principals' offers plays an important role in the failure of the Revelation Principle in Common Agency games. In addition we provide a new...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027080

Bargaining under incomplete information, fairness, and the hold-up problem

Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005

In the hold-up problem incomplete contracts cause the proceeds of relation-specific investments to be allocated by ex-post bargaining. The present paper investigates the efficiency of incomplete contracts if individuals have heterogeneous preferences implying heterogeneous bargaining behavior...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010371083

Contract (re-)negotiation with private and common values

Gretschko, Vitali; Wambach, Achim - 2017

We analyze the contracting problem of a principal who faces an agent with private information and cannot commit to not renegotiating a chosen contract. We model this by allowing the principal to propose new contracts any number of times after observing the contract choice of the agent. We...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011753991

Optimal Mechanism Design with Resale Via Bargaining

Zhang, Jun - 2016

In this paper, we examine the optimal mechanism design of selling an indivisible object to one regular buyer and one publicly known buyer, where inter-buyer resale cannot be prohibited. The resale market is modeled as a stochastic ultimatum bargaining game between the two buyers. We fully...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012989366

Moral hazard and bargaining over incentive contracts

Dittrich, Marcus; Städter, Silvio - 2014

This paper analyses bargaining over an incentive compatible contract in a moral hazard framework. We introduce the Kalai-Smorodinsky bargaining solution and compare the outcome with the commonly applied Nash solution. Whether worker's effort is higher in the Nash or the Kalai-Smorodinsky...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010388771

Eliciting information from a committee

Zapechelnyuk, Andriy - 2012

The paper addresses the mechanism design problem of eliciting truthful information from a committee of informed experts who collude in their information disclosure strategies. It is shown that under fairly general conditions full information disclosure is possible if and only if the induced...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009517819