We examine theoretically and experimentally how combining between-team and within-team incentives affects behavior in team tournaments. Theory predicts that free-riding is likely to occur when there are only between-team incentives, and offering within-team incentives may solve this problem....

Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit...

We study games of public delegated common agency under asymmetric information. Using tools from non-smooth analysis and optimal control, we derive best responses and characterize equilibria (both continuous and discontinuous) using self-generating optimization programs of which any equilibrium...

Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit...

Efficiency under contractual incompleteness often requires voluntary cooperation in situations where self-regarding incentives for contractual compliance are present as well. Here we provide a comprehensive experimental analysis based on the gift-exchange game of how explicit and implicit...

This paper extends Savage's subjective approach to probability and utility from decision problems under exogenous uncertainty to choice in strategic environments. Interactive uncertainty is modeled both explicitly, using hierarchies of preference relations, the analogue of beliefs hierarchies,...

An aggregate game is a normal-form game with the property that each player's payoff is a function of only his own strategy and an aggregate of the strategy profile of all players. Such games possess properties that can often yield simple characterizations of equilibrium aggregates without re-...

We study a coordination game on a fixed connected network where players have to choose between two projects. Some players are moderate (i.e. they are ex-ante indifferent between both project) while others are stubborn (i.e. they always choose the same project). Benefits for moderate players are...

We study the optimal management of evolving hierarchies, which abound in real-life phenomena. An initiator invests into finding a subordinate, who will bring revenues to the joint venture and who will invest herself into finding another subordinate, and so on. The higher the individual...

Presently, we can not find the scientific analysis that clearly explains the deepest roots of global economical and moral crisis. Because of that many famous politicians, economists, sociologists denote the understanding of current situation as the most valuable attainment. Under traditional...