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We study the impact of succession tournaments on risk-taking in family firms. More sons (less daughters) in controlling families are associated with higher income volatility and lower performance – especially, in opaque private firms with pyramidal ownership structure. Contestants exhibit...
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This is the online appendix for 'Family Feud: Succession Tournaments and Risk-taking in Family Firms' available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=2703571.We identify succession as a novel determinant of risk-taking in family firms. We find significantly higher risk-taking (M&A and cash flow...
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We show in a theoretical model that credit default swaps induce managerial agency problems through two channels: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the intensity of monitoring by creditors, which leads to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012453649
We show in a theoretical model that credit default swaps induce managerial agency problems through two channels: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the intensity of monitoring by creditors, which leads to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932017
We show in a theoretical model that credit default swaps induce managerial agency problems through two channels: reducing the opportunity for managers to transfer value to equityholders from creditors via strategic default, and reducing the intensity of monitoring by creditors, which leads to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012941985
We study dynamic incentive contracts in a continuous-time agency model with productivity switching between two unobserved states, about which an investor may learn by deviating from the myopically optimal action. The optimal contract balances short-run profits from myopic actions and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013109124
We study dynamic incentive contracts in a continuous-time agency model with productivity switching between two unobserved states, about which an investor may learn by deviating from the myopically optimal action. The optimal contract balances short-run profits from myopic actions and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013113204