A firm employs workers to obtain costly unverifiable information for example, categorizing the content of images. Workers are monitored by comparing their messages. The optimal contract under limited liability exhibits three key features: (i) the monitoring technology depends crucially on the...

This paper studies how persistence can be used to create incentives in a continuous-time stochastic game in which a long-run player interacts with a sequence of short-run players. Observation of the long-run player's actions are distorted by a Brownian motion and the actions of both players...

I study how the persistence of past choices can be used to create incentives in a continuous time stochastic game in which a large player, such as a firm, interacts with a sequence of short-run players, such as customers. The long-run player faces moral hazard and her past actions are...

A Principal appoints a committee of partially informed experts to choose a policy. The experts' preferences are aligned with each other but conflict with hers. We study whether she gains from banning committee members from communicating or \deliberating" before voting. Our main result is that if...