We give a sufficient condition on the type space for revenue equivalence when the set of social alternatives consists of probability distributions over a finite set. Types are identified with real-valued functions that assign valuations to elements of this finite set, and the type space is...

A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents, who can buy at most one object. Each agent's preference over (object, payment) pairs need not be quasilinear. The seller considers the following desiderata for her mechanism, which she terms desirable: (1) strategy-proofness, (2) ex-post...

We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multi-dimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the interim distribution of types is common knowledge (the exact number of agents for each type is known), then a mechanism...

I study costly information acquisition in a two-sided matching problem, such as matching applicants to schools. Applicant's utility is a sum of common and idiosyncratic components. The idiosyncratic component is unknown to applicants but can be learned at a cost. When applicants are assigned...

How should a group of people decide to allocate a task that has to be done but is not adequately rewarded? This paper finds an optimal mechanism for the private provision of a public service in an environment without monetary transfers. All members of the group have the same cost of providing...