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Efficient assignment mechanisms for liquidity-constrained agents

Che, Yeon-Koo; Gale, Ian L.; Kim, Jinwoo - In: International journal of industrial organization 31 (2013) 5, pp. 659-665

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010248413

Market versus non-market assignment of initial ownerhsip

Che, Yeon-Koo (contributor); Gale, Ian L. (contributor) - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003600255

'Know thy enemies' : knowledge of rivals' types and its effect on auctions

Che, Yeon-Koo (contributor); Kim, Jinwoo (contributor) - 2001 - [Elektronische Ressource]

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001606790

Competitive procurement with corruption

Burguet, Roberto; Che, Yeon-Koo - 2000

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001711305

Asymptotic equivalence of probabilistic serial and random priority mechanisms

Che, Yeon-Koo (contributor); Kojima, Fuhito (contributor) - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003773570

Asymptotic equivalence of probabilistic serial and random priority mechanisms

Che, Yeon-Koo (contributor); Kojima, Fuhito (contributor) - 2008

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003781710

Efficient assignment with interdependent values

Che, Yeon-Koo; Kim, Jinwoo; Kojima, Fuhito - In: Journal of economic theory 158 (2015), pp. 54-86

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011548611

Asymptotic equivalence of probalistic serial and random priority mechanisms

Che, Yeon-Koo; Kojima, Fuhito - In: Econometrica : journal of the Econometric Society, an … 78 (2010) 5, pp. 1625-1672

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008798257

Efficiency, justified envy, and incentives in priority-based matching

Abdulkadiroğlu, Atila; Che, Yeon-Koo; Pathak, Parag A.; … - In: The American economic review .... 2 (2020) 4, pp. 425-442

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012596113

Asymptotic Equivalence of Probabilistic Serial and Random Priority Mechanisms

Che, Yeon-Koo - 2008

The random priority (random serial dictatorship) mechanism is a common method for assigning objects to individuals. The mechanism is easy to implement and strategy-proof. However this mechanism is inefficient, as the agents may be made all better off by another mechanism that increases their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012770179