This paper considers the object allocation problem introduced by Shapley and Scarf (1974). We study secure implementation (Saijo, Sjöström, and Yamato, 2007), that is, double implementation in dominant strategy and Nash equilibria. We prove that (i) an individually rational solution is...

We consider house (re)allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. We are concerned with the possibility that a pair of agents may gain by swapping their endowments before the operation of the chosen rule. A rule is called endowments-swapping-proof if it is immune to...

We consider the problems of fairly allocating indivisible objects and money. The objective of the present study is to examine strategic manipulation under envy-free solutions. We show that each individual obtains the welfare level of his "optimal" envy-free allocation by maximally manipulating...

We consider house allocation problems (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) with strict preferences. We introduce a new axiom called pre-exchange-proofness, which states that no pair of agents gain by exchanging their endowments with each other prior to the operation of the chosen rule. We establish that a...

This paper studies housing markets in the presence of constraints on the number of agents involved in exchanges. We search for mechanisms satisfying effective endowments-swapping proofness, which requires that no pair of agents can gain by “individually rational” swapping their endowments...

We consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object when monetary transfers are possible, and examine the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms to solve the problem. We propose a mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, and Bayesian incentive...

We consider the problem of fairly allocating one indivisible object when monetary transfers are possible, and examine the existence of Bayesian incentive compatible mechanisms to solve the problem. We propose a mechanism that satisfies envy-freeness, budget balancedness, and Bayesian incentive...