Many theories of updating under ambiguity assume either dynamic consistency or consequentialism to underpin behaviorally the link between conditional and unconditional preferences. To test the descriptive validity of these rationality concepts, we conduct a dynamic extension of Ellsbergʼs...

In this paper, we extend Aumann’s (Ann Stat 4:1236–1239, 1976) probabilistic agreement theorem to situations in which agents’ prior beliefs are represented by a common neo-additive capacity. In particular, we characterize the family of updating rules for neo-additive capacities, which are...

In this paper, we extend Aumann’s (Ann Stat 4:1236–1239, <CitationRef CitationID="CR1">1976</CitationRef>) probabilistic agreement theorem to situations in which agents’ prior beliefs are represented by a common neo-additive capacity. In particular, we characterize the family of updating rules for neo-additive capacities, which are...</citationref>

In this paper we show that unlike in Bayesian frameworks asymmetric information does matter and can explain differences in common knowledge decisions due to ambiguous character of agents' private information. Agents share a common-but-not-necessarily-additive prior beliefs represented by...

Does exposure to cognitive load affect key properties of economic behavior? In this experiment, subjects face a series of simple binary decision tasks between prospects, testing for monotonicity in monetary payments, consistency with (first-order) stochastic dominance, reduction of compound...

This paper shows that, for CEU preferences, the axioms consquentialism, state independence and conditional certainty equivalent consistency under updating characterise a family of capacities, called Genralised Neo-Additive Capacities (GNAC). This family contains as special cases among others...