We investigate what it means for one act to be more ambiguous than another. The question is evidently analogous to asking what makes one prospect riskier than another, but beliefs are neither objective nor representable by a unique probability. Our starting point is an abstract class of...

Following the seminal works of Schmeidler (1989), Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), roughly put, an agent’s subjective beliefs are said to be ambiguous if the beliefs may not be represented by a unique probability distribution, in the standard Bayesian fashion, but instead by a set of...

Abstract This paper concerns the interpretation of equilibrium in non-additive beliefs in two-player normal form games. We argue that such equilibria involve beliefs and actions which are consistent with a lack of common knowledge of the game. Our argument rests on representation results which...

We investigate what it means for one act to be more ambiguous than another. The question is evidently analogous to asking what makes one prospect riskier than another, but beliefs are neither objective nor representable by a unique probability. Our starting point is an abstract class of...