We investigate whether managers “hide” bad news by announcing earnings during periods of low attention, or by providing less forewarning of an upcoming earnings announcement. Our findings are consistent with managers reporting bad news after market hours, on busy days, and with less advance...

We examine whether Basu's (1997) differential timeliness metric and the related C-Score metric are effective in detecting predictable differences in conservatism surrounding corrections of overstated earnings. Cross-sectional and time-series analyses, employing 2,132 firms making restatements...

We examine whether Basu's (1997) differential timeliness metric and the related C-Score metric are effective in detecting predictable differences in conservatism surrounding corrections of overstated earnings. Cross-sectional and time-series analyses, employing 2,132 firms making restatements...

This Internet Appendix includes supplementary discussion and analyses. The original paper "Market (in)attention and the strategic scheduling and timing of earnings announcements" is available at the following URL: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2545966" http://ssrn.com/abstract=2545966