We explore how inherent preferences for reciprocity and repeated interaction interact in an optimal incentive system … rents can be used to provide incentives. Preferences for reciprocity still affect the structure of an employment … relationship early on, though, because of two reasons: first, preferences for reciprocity effectively reduce the employee's effort …

This paper explores how a relational contract establishes a norm of reciprocity and how such a norm shapes the … employer’s commitment. Generally, direct and reciprocity-based incentives reinforce each other and should thus optimally be … that activate the norm of reciprocity are more important when an employee is close to retirement. In earlier stages, direct …

the presumption that a relational contract can establish a norm of reciprocity, I show that generous upfront wages that … the employer’s commitment which is generally determined by her future profits. Moreover, since future profits are affected … by the employee’s reciprocal preferences, the norm of reciprocity already shapes the incentive system at the beginning of …

the article we describe the key features of venture capital contracts, the characteristics of selected contract elements … and their impact on corporate operations and the contracting parties. After the presentation of individual contract …

, we exploit an exogenous change in the contract structure in 2003, the piece rate increasing from 20.2 to 22.9 euros. We …

This paper examines the optimal provision of incentives for contract designers. A principal hires an agent to draft a … contract that is incomplete because the ex-ante specified design might not be appropriate ex-post. The degree of contract … characterize the optimal incentive scheme for the agent and discuss implications for the degree of contract incompleteness and the …

with reflections on the future of relational contract theory and practice. …

that the principal cares for them. Principals can signal their altruism by offering a generous contract, consisting of a … agents do not reciprocate the principal's altruism, the principal may find it optimal to write a contract that simultaneously … signals his altruism and screens reciprocal worker types. I show that such a contract is characterised by excessively strong …

of those gains. Incentive contracting in these environments does not crowd-out off-equilibrium cooperation, and at high … incentive levels cooperation is crowded in …