Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

Many cartels are formed by individual managers of different firms, but not by firms as collectives. However, most of the literature in industrial economics neglects individuals' incentives to form cartels. Although oligopoly experiments reveal important insights on individuals acting as firms,...

The Intercontinental Exchange's current attempted acquisition of NYSE-Euronext is the third takeover proposal in as many years. In this article the two previous attempts are reviewed and lessons are drawn from an antitrust and competition policy perspective concerning the evolving competitive...

This paper analyses the extent of inter-format retail competition between supermarkets, discounters and drugstores in Germany, using data from the German market for diapers. We estimate a random coefficient logit model at the individual household level. Based on consumer substitution patterns,...

Research on bargaining power in vertical relationships is scarce. It remains particularly unclear which factors drive bargaining power between negotiating parties in a vertical structure. We use a demand model where consumer demand determines the total pie of industry prots. Moreover, we apply a...

We analyze horizontal mergers when the acquirer holds a passive partial ownership stake (PPO) in the target firm prior to the merger. We show that a PPO reduces the minimal synergy level necessary to make a merger beneficial for consumers. It follows that an antitrust authority ignoring existing...