Excessive pricing by a dominant firm is unlawful in many countries. To assess whether it is excessive, the dominant firm's price is often compared with price benchmarks. We examine the competitive implications of two such benchmarks: a retrospective benchmark where the price that prevails after...

The aim of this paper is to provide a coherent approach to the prohibition of excessive pricing by dominant firms as an antitrust violation. It first highlights the rationale for the prohibition, and shows that the prohibition exists and is also enforced in many countries. It then shows why...

Passive holdings and cross-investments among competing companies are common phenomena in the modern marketplace. Yet under certain market conditions such investments may cause anticompetitive effects. This paper explores the economic effects of passive investments and their regulation under...

Passive holdings and cross-investments among competing companies are common phenomena in the modern marketplace. Yet under certain market conditions such investments may cause anticompetitive effects. This article explores the economic effects of passive investments and their regulation under...

There is a growing concern that minority shareholding (MS) in rival firms may facilitate collusion. To examine this concern, we exploit the fact that leniency programs (LPs) are generally recognized as a shock that destabilizes collusive agreements and study the effect that the introduction of...