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This paper discusses the claim made in Altonji and Pierret (1997) and Lange (2005) that a high speed of employer learning indicates a low value of job market signaling. The claim is first discussed intuitively in light of Spence’s original model and then evaluated in a simple extension of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003469479
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009230955
This paper discusses the claim made in Altonji and Pierret (1997) and Lange (2005) that a high speed of employer learning indicates a low value of job market signaling. The claim is first discussed intuitively in light of Spence's original model and then evaluated in a simple extension of a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013317436