How do the labor market values of executives' personal traits evolve over time? We propose and estimate an interactive fixed effects model, which allows for time-variant valuation of unobserved manager attributes. We find that managerial talent is the most important unobserved trait determining...

Using a three-way mixed effects model to quantify firm-manager match effects in executive compensation, we find that unobservable match heterogeneity explains a considerable proportion of the compensation variation. Firms compensate managers for productivity generated by the efficient match, so...

How do the labor market values of executives' personal traits evolve over time? We propose and estimate an interactive fixed effects model, which allows for time-variant valuation of unobserved manager attributes. We find that managerial talent is the most important unobserved trait determining...

Human capital and deferred compensation might explain why firms employ but do nothire older workers. Adjustments of wage-tenure profiles for older new entrants areexplored in the context of deferred compensation. From an equity theory perspective,such adjustments might lead to adverse incentive...

This paper explores the concept of profit sharing as a prospective source of labour income. The paper suggests a paradigm shift: a synthesis of differing perspectives in wage formation to redefine the concept of labour income. The proposed arrangements attempt to conceptualise the productive...

This paper develops a new rationale for the emergence of pay-for-performance contracts. The labor market is competitive, workers are risk averse and firms risk neutral. The paper shows that in stable environments more productive workers self-select into pay-for-performance jobs because risk is...

The excessive compensation packages of CEOs of U.S. corporations in recent years have brought the issue of fairness to the foreground in economics. The conventional wisdom is that the free market for labor, which determines the pay packages, cares only about efficiency and not fairness. We...

In an economy in which asset management firms compete both for money to manage and for managers to manage it, I show that a manager's compensation scheme is endogenously benchmarked against the market return when the expected market return is high whereas it is benchmarked against the...

In this lecture I first give an explanation for invidious preferences based on the (evolutionary) competition for resources. Then I show that these preferences have wide ranging and empirically relevant effects on labor markets, such as: workplace skill segregation, gradual promotions, wage...

In this paper, we undertake an evaluation of the laws governing wages in India, identify their shortcomings and offer suggestions for improvement. In doing so, we analyze the provisions in the relevant ILO Conventions and look at the laws and practice in selected developed and emerging...