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On delegation under relational contracts
Gürtler, Oliver - 2006
In this paper, a principal's decision between delegating two tasks or handling one of the two tasks herself is analyzed. We assume that the principal uses both, formal contracts and informal agreements sustained by the value of future relationships (relational contracts) as incentive device. It...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010365874
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Motivate and select : relational contracts with persistent types
Nikolowa, Radoslawa - 2014
's type. We find that the form of the optimal contract depends on the job characteristics as well as the distribution of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010382180
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The management of talent for innovation : optimal contracting for selection and incentives
Foarta, Dana; Sugaya, Takuo - 2018
contract and show how it separates the employee types. The optimal contract menu pairs a higher probability of assignment to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011980048
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Contracts and Money
Jovanovic, Boyan; Ueda, Masako - 1998
entail a lower level of welfare for the parties to that contract. They also imply that real variables respond to nominal …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014221656
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Contractual incentive provision and commitment in rent-seeking contests
Gürtler, Oliver - 2006
In this paper, we consider a symmetric rent-seeking contest, where employees lobby for a governmental contract on … behalf of firms. The only verifiable information is which firm is assigned the contract. We derive the optimal wage contracts … of the employees and analyze, whether commitment by determining the wage contract prior to the competitor is profitable …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343953
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Team Incentives in Relational Employment Contracts
Kvaloy, Ola; Olsen, Trond E. - 2005
performance, in a relational contract between a principal and a team of two agents. A main result is that the optimal incentive … agents' productivites affect the principal's temptation to renege on the relational contract. The analysis suggests that we …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014027830
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Fairness, adverse selection, and employment contracts
Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005
This paper considers a firm whose potential employees have private information on both their productivity and the extent of their fairness concerns. Fairness is modelled as inequity aversion, where fair-minded workers suffer if their colleagues get more income net of production costs. Screening...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010366541
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Tournaments, individualized contracts and career concerns
Koch, Alexander K. (contributor);  … - 2005
Young professionals typically do not enter into life-long employment relations with a single firm. Therefore, future employers can learn about individuals' abilities from the observable facts regarding earlier work relations. We show that these informational spill-overs have profound...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003275078
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Fairness, adverse selection, and employment contracts
Siemens, Ferdinand von - 2005 - This Version: July 2005
This paper considers a firm whose potential employees have private information on both their productivity and the extent of their fairness concerns. Fairness is modelled as inequity aversion, where fair-minded workers suffer if their colleagues get more income net of production costs. Screening...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010440434
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Rank Uncertainty in Organizations
Halac, Marina - 2020
A principal incentivizes a team of agents to work by privately offering them bonuses contingent on team success. We study the principal's optimal incentive scheme that implements work as a unique equilibrium. This scheme leverages rank uncertainty to address strategic uncertainty. Each agent is...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012839589