This paper models privatization as a cooperative game between the government, a trade union and the private shareholders. These players know that privatization increases the efficiency of a firm, but only the management of the firm knows the exact value of the relevant productivity-increasing...

This paper models privatization as a cooperative game between the government, a trade union and the private shareholders. These players kno w that privatization increases the efficiency of a firm, but only the management of the firm knows the exact value of the relevant productivity-increasing...

Compared with the traditional public-finance approach of a monolithic fully informed planner, earmarking of taxation is less likely to be optimal if a principal-agent setting is considered, where taxing and spending are performed by two separate agents which are monitored by the parliament. We...

This paper models privatization as a cooperative game between the government, a trade union and the private shareholders. These players know that privatization increases the efficiency of a firm, but only the management of the firm knows the exact value of the relevant productivity-increasing...

In this paper the role of information asymmetries between regions and a centralized authority is analyzed. In a model with inter-regional externalities due to capital mobility and a source-based tax instrument, we first derive conditions for which the optimum can be implemented by an adequately...