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Awareness in repeated games
Mengel, Friederike; Tsakas, Elias; Vostroknutov, Alexander - 2009
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937141
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Essays on strategic incentives for information revelation
Serrano-Padial, Ricardo - 2007
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009689759
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Interlinkage and generous tit-for-tat strategy
Matsushima, Hitoshi - In: The Japanese economic review : the journal of the … 65 (2014) 1, pp. 116-121
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010425072
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Comments on purification in continuum games
Balder, Erik J. - In: International journal of game theory : official journal … 37 (2008) 1, pp. 73-92
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003715317
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Learning from private information in noisy repeated games
Fudenberg, Drew; Yamamoto, Yuichi - In: Journal of economic theory 146 (2011) 5, pp. 1733-1769
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009308146
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Repeated signaling games
Kaya, Ayça - In: Games and economic behavior 66 (2009) 2, pp. 841-854
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003871689
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Repeated signaling games
Kaya, Ayça (contributor) - 2005
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003173618
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Signaling with Private Monitoring
Cisternas, Gonzalo - 2020
We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A long-run player signals her type continuously over time to a myopic second player who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the myopic player transmits his private inferences back...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012826845
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Signaling with private monitoring
Cisternas, Gonzalo; Kolb, Aaron - 2021
We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A forward-looking sender signals her type continuously over time to a myopic receiver who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the receiver transmits his private inferences back through...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012797860
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Signaling with Private Monitoring
Cisternas, Gonzalo; Kolb, Aaron - 2022
We study dynamic signaling when the informed party does not observe the signals generated by her actions. A forward-looking sender signals her type continuously over time to a myopic receiver who privately monitors her behavior; in turn, the receiver transmits his private inferences back through...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013310444