We present a simple model where, before competing in prices, firms announce which prices they intend to choose. Deviating from these announcements involves a cost. We show that sharing pricing intentions results in prices being set above their competitive levels. All equilibria result in prices...

We investigate the nature of trading and sorting induced by the dynamic price mechanism in a competitive durable good market with adverse selection and exogenous entry of traders over time. The model is a dynamic version of Akerlof (1970). Identical cohorts of durable goods, whose quality is...

When consumers do not know the prices at which different firms sell, they often also do not know production costs. Consumer search models which take asymmetric information about production costs into account continue focusing on reservation price equilibria (RPE) and their properties. We argue...

We analyze a dynamic version of the Akerlof-Wilson "lemons" market in a competitive durable good setting. There is a fixed set of sellers with private information about the quality of their wares. The price mechanism sorts sellers of different qualities into different time periods-prices and...