One-size-fits-all recommendations are common in many contexts, including those with a widespread heterogeneity. We propose a model that rationalizes this phenomenon. An expert recommends publicly to two agents whether to adopt a policy. The expert is privately informed about agents' payoffs from...

This article develops a Bayesian persuasion model examining a manager's incentives to gather information when the manager can disseminate this information selectively to interested parties (“users”) and when the objectives of the manager and the users are not perfectly aligned. The model...

We investigate the issue of implementation via individually rational ex-post budget-balanced Bayesian mechanisms. We show that all decision rules generating a nonnegative expected social surplus are implementable if and only if the probability distribution of the agents' types satisfies two...

A crucial aspect behind rational decision making in an economic game is the availability of complete information. Democratic elections can be modelled as one such game, where the electorate and candidates are competing players. In the democratic game, the electorate suffers from asymmetry of...