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Informational hold up and intermediaries

Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14

Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049

Chapter 9. Algorithmic Mechanism Design : Through the lens of Multiunit auctions

Nisan, Noam - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 477-515). 2015

addressing it by focusing on a single simple problem: multiunit auctions. A variety of issues will be discussed: representation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014025450

Mechanism design with aftermarkets : on the optimality of cutoff mechanisms

Dworczak, Piotr - 2016

I study a mechanism design problem of allocating a single good to an agent when the mechanism is followed by a post-mechanism game (aftermarket) played between the agent and a third-party. The aftermarket is beyond the direct control of the designer. However, she can influence the information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011865063

Endogenous worst-case beliefs in first-price auctions

Gretschko, Vitali; Mass, Helene - 2018

Bidding in first-price auctions crucially depends on the beliefs of the bidders about their competitors' willingness to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011946017

Auctions with imperfect commitment when the reserve may signal the auctioneer's type

Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2013

If bidders are uncertain whether the auctioneer sticks to the announced reserve, some bidders respond by not bidding, speculating that the auctioneer may revoke the reserve. However, the reserve inadvertently signals the auctioneer's type, which drives a unique separating and a multitude of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009781360

Optimal Threats and Efficient Mechanism Design

Njiki Njiki, Paul Samuel - 2010

This paper studies Bayesian efficient mechanism design in environments where agents' utility depend on the chosen alternative even if they do not participate. A VCG mechanism maximizes the expected revenue of the planner among efficient mechanisms that induce the truthful participation of all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014206146

Mechanism design for unequal societies

Groh, Carl-Christian; Reuter, Marco - 2023

We study optimal mechanisms for a utilitarian designer who seeks to assign a finite number of goods to a group of ex ante heterogeneous agents with unit demand. The agents have heterogeneous marginal utilities of money, which may naturally arise in environments where agents have different wealth...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014438989

Security bid auctions for agency contracts

Chŏn, Pyŏng-hŏn; Wolfstetter, Elmar - 2013

A principal uses security bid auctions to award an incentive contract to one among several agents in the presence of … call a fixed wage contract, tends to outperform all other auctions, although it is not an optimal mechanism. However, by … adding output targets to hybrid share auctions one can (arbitrary closely) implement the optimal mechanism. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010227234

Optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries : conference paper

Rosar, Frank - 2013 - This version: February 5, 2013

I study the interaction between optimal procurement and outsourcing of production in small industries. First, two sellers decide about outsourcing. By outsourcing, a seller loses information about the costs of producing to his supplier. Then the buyer designs the procurement mechanism and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010340964

Negotiating cultures in corporate procurement : conference paper

Rosar, Frank; Müller, Florian - 2014 - (This version: February 5, 2014)

For a repeated procurement problem, we compare two stylized negotiating cultures which differ in how the buyer uses an entrant to exert pressure on the incumbent resembling U.S. style and Japanese style procurement. In each period, the suppliers are privately informed about their production...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010490631