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Multi-period contracts between principal and agent with adverse selection : received 29.5.1984

Besanko, David - In: Economics letters 17 (1985) 1/2, pp. 33-37

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001911319

Regulation, asymmetric information, and auditing

Baron, David P. - In: The Rand journal of economics 15 (1984) 4, pp. 447-470

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001013147

Antitrust enforcement under asymmetric information

Besanko, David - In: The economic journal : the journal of the Royal … 99 (1989) 396, pp. 408-425

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001071893

Monitoring, moral hazard, asymmetric information, and risk sharing in procurement contracting

Baron, David P. - In: The Rand journal of economics 18 (1987) 4, pp. 509-532

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001043632

Congested mergers and equilibrium antirust policy

Besanko, David - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 9 (1993) 1, pp. 1-29

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001168897

Rules for the rulemakers : asymmetric information and the political economy of benefit-cost analysis

Besanko, David; Kreps, Avner A.; Yang, Clair Zhuqing - In: Journal of regulatory economics 66 (2024) 1, pp. 1-51

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015123256

Buyer-option contracts restored : renegotiation, inefficient threats, and the hold-up problem

Lyon, Thomas P.; Rasmusen, Eric - In: The journal of law, economics, & organization 20 (2004) 1, pp. 148-169

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002047056

Buyer-option contracts restored : renegotiation, inefficient threats, and the hold-up problem

Lyon, Thomas P.; Rasmusen, Eric - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001983693

Buyer-Option Contracts Restored : Renegotiation, Inefficient Threats, and the Hold-Up Problem

Lyon, Thomas P.; Rasmusen, Eric - 2014

'Buyer-option' contracts, in which the buyer selects the product variant to be traded and chooses whether to accept delivery, are often used to solve holdup problems. We present a simple game that focuses sharply on subgames in which the buyer proposes inefficient actions in order to improve his...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014029699

Self-regulation and regulatory discretion : why firms may be reluctant to signal green

Lyon, Thomas P.; Maxell, John W. - In: Strategy beyond markets, (pp. 301-329). 2016

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011485197