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Automated Multilateral Negotiation on Multiple Issues with Private Information

Zheng, Ronghuo - 2019

In this paper, we propose and analyze a distributed negotiation strategy for a multi-agent multi-attribute negotiation … concede during the negotiation, we propose and analyze a reactive concession strategy. We demonstrate through computational … experiments that our distributed negotiation strategy yields performance sufficiently close to the Nash bargaining solution, and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012903886

Rhetoric in legislative bargaining with asymmetric information

Chen, Ying; Eraslan, Hülya - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 2, pp. 483-513

We analyze a three-player legislative bargaining game over an ideological and a distributive decision. Legislators are privately informed about their ideological intensities, i.e., the weight placed on the ideological decision relative to the weight placed on the distributive decision....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674460

Compromises and Incentives

Di Giannatale Menegalli, Sonia; Curiel-Cabral, Itza T. Q. - Centro de Investigación y Docencia Económicas (CIDE) - 2013

We analyze a situation where a Principal does not necessarily have all the bargaining power while negotiating a contract with an Agent by studying a dynamic multi-objective moral hazard model with hidden action. We .nd that the structure of the optimal contracts change along the Pareto Frontier,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010823261

Beyond dividing the pie : multi-issue bargaining in the laboratory

Bochet, Olivier; Khanna, Manshu; Siegenthaler, Simon - In: The review of economic studies : RES 91 (2024) 1, pp. 163-191

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014528570

North-South climate change negotiations : a sequential game with asymmetric information

Caparrós Gass, Alejandro; Pereau, Jean-Christophe; … - 2003

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001743033

Does Strengthening Collective Action Clauses (CACs) Help?

Ghosal, Sayantan; Kannika Thampanishvong - 2007

We study the effect of strengthening CACs in a debt rollover model of a sovereign debt crisis. Conditional on default, there are multiple equilibria: the impact of strengthening CACs depends critically on the prevailing equilibrium. For a subset of equilibria, (i) given a fixed number of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014049846

Adverse Selection, Impatience, and Immediate or Delayed Bargaining Agreements

Fairchild, Richard J. - 2002

A standard result in bargaining with symmetric information is that agents exploit all gains from trade, and reach efficient agreements immediately. Models of delayed and inefficient agreements are typically based on asymmetric information regarding bargainer types. However, such models often...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014105265

Chapter 50 Bargaining with incomplete information

Ausubel, Lawrence M.; Cramton, Peter; Deneckere, Raymond J. - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 1897-1945). 2002

A central question in economics is understanding the difficulties that parties have in reaching mutually beneficial agreements. Informational differences provide an appealing explanation for bargaining inefficiencies. This chapter provides an overview of the theoretical and empirical literature...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024495

North-South Climate Change Negotiations : A Sequential Game with Asymmetric Information

Caparrós Gass, Alejandro; Pereau, Jean-Christophe; … - 2003

This article determines the conditions under which the Southern countries should act together, or separately, while negotiating with the North about climate change policy and about the conditions for future Southern engagement. The paper models the international negotiations with complete and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014031100

Settlement under the threat of conflict : the cost of asymmetric information

Sjöberg, Eric - 2014

I study a situation where two players disagree on the division of a good. In the first of two stages, the players can divide the good peacefully between them by signing a contract. If either or both players reject the contract, they must engage in a costly contest over the good. One of the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010337007