We consider loans being marked to market to constitute new information that is only immediately available to large institutional traders, so-called qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). Smaller investors (non-QIBs) do not have instant access to such information. Investigating the effects of...

Using highly detailed data on the loan portfolios of large U.S. banks, we document that these banks "specialize" by concentrating their lending disproportionately into one industry. This specialization improves a bank’s industry-specific knowledge and allows it to offer generous loan terms to...

We examine the impact on a firm when it is exogenously forced to switch its bank relationship from one branch to another branch of the same bank. We show the effect depends directly on the relative balance between the hard accounting information provided to the bank by the firm, as part of the...

We consider loans being marked to market to constitute information about borrowing firms' profitability and risk only immediately available to large institutional traders, so-called qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). Smaller investors, so-called non-QIBs, do not have immediate access to such...