Why do firms engage in costly, voluntary disclosure of informationwhich is subsumed by a later announcement? We consider a model inwhich the firm's manager can choose to disclose short-term informationwhich becomes redundant later. When disclosure costs are sufficientlylow, the manager discloses...

We study how dynamic research affects information acquisition in financial markets. In our strategic trading model, the trader performs costly research to generate private information but does not always succeed. Optimal research activity responds to market conditions and generates novel...

We allow a strategic trader to choose when to acquire information about an asset's payoff, instead of endowing her with it. When the trader dynamically controls the precision of a flow of information, the optimal precision evolves stochastically and increases with market liquidity. However,...

We develop a model of voluntary disclosure in the presence of diversely-informed investors. The manager's disclosure strategy influences trading by investors, which in turn affects the manager's incentives to disclose. We document conditions under which there exists a unique equilibrium where...

We study the prices of a firm's debt and equity in a market where investors have private information and may exhibit differences of opinion. We show how debt and equity valuations, and the impact of public information and distress risk on these valuations, depend upon disagreement and the...