We consider loans being marked to market to constitute new information that is only immediately available to large institutional traders, so-called qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). Smaller investors (non-QIBs) do not have instant access to such information. Investigating the effects of...

We consider loans being marked to market to constitute information about borrowing firms' profitability and risk only immediately available to large institutional traders, so-called qualified institutional buyers (QIBs). Smaller investors, so-called non-QIBs, do not have immediate access to such...

When a firm’s loans are first traded in the secondary market, private information about the firm is disclosed to a select group of large investors, so called “Qualified Institutional Buyers” (QIBs). We document a significant information effect that benefits these buyers in the firm’s...

We identify a group of lenders specializing in syndicating tradable loans (referred to as transactional lenders, “TLs”). We show that borrowers borrowing from TLs experience worse operating performance and more severe credit quality deterioration after loan origination compared to those...