I consider a contest in which the quantity of output is rewarded and another in which the quality of output is rewarded. The output in the quality contest plays a dual role. It counts in the quality contest but it is also converted into quantity-equivalent output to obtain total output in the...

I study a model of procurement with moral hazard and adverse selection. The procurer is either corrupt or honest and can choose between sole-sourcing and competitive tender. I compare two procurement regulations: no sole-sourcing is allowed (rigid regulation) and sole-sourcing is allowed in an...

Some empirical studies have found that third-party intervention could worsen civil conflicts. However, exactly why this might be the case is not clear. This paper builds a model to explain how a third-party's expected intervention in a conflict could worsen the conflict. I study a two-period...

I consider a two-stage elimination contest with uninformed and informed players. Informed players can signal their type to future uninformed opponents through their efforts in the first stage. Relative to the benchmark case of complete information, I find that an informed player exerts a higher...

I consider a model in which an autocrat can invest in fiscal capacity and thus be able to tax his subjects (citizens). Investment in fiscal capacity is costless but comes with a demand for fiscal accountability by the citizens, something akin to the spirit of the slogan "no taxation without...

We study two all-pay auctions, where contestants cannot compete in both auctions. One contest has a higher prize than the other. Ideally, high-ability contestants should participate in the contest with a higher prize. We find that this is not necessarily the case. We show that the top contestant...