Showing 1 - 10 of 1,425
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003624605
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003783162
We consider a general economy, where agents have private information about their types. Types can be multi-dimensional and potentially interdependent. We show that, if the interim distribution of types is common knowledge (the exact number of agents for each type is known), then a mechanism...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010345986
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009545873
When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey auction produces efficient, core outcomes that yield competitive seller … revenues. In contrast, with complements, the Vickrey outcome, while efficient, is not necessarily in the core and revenue can … be very low. Non-core outcomes may be perceived as unfair since there are bidders willing to pay more than the winners …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014200952
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003942124
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011485608
When goods are substitutes, the Vickrey outcome is in the core and yields competitive seller revenue. In contrast, with … complements, the Vickrey outcome is efficient but not necessarily in the core and revenue can be low. Non-core outcomes may be … perceived as unfair since there are bidders willing to pay more than the winners' payments. Moreover, non-core outcomes render …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011673080
We study the optimal selling mechanism and information disclosure policy for a house seller. The seller can select any selling mechanism, including an auction, and release additional information about the house to buyers. Release of information adjusts the buyers' values and bids. We find that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013247089
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011552915