We study firms' incentives to acquire private information in a setting where subsequent competition leads to firms' later signaling their private information to rivals. Due to signaling, equilibrium prices are distorted, and so while firms benefit from obtaining more precise private information,...

A client has a problem, but does not know whether it is serious or minor. She consults an expert who can correctly diagnose and fix her problem. This paper characterizes the equilibrium pricing and recommendation strategies of an expert under the assumptions that i) the type of treatment is...

This paper studies the impact of liability on a credence-good seller's incentives to maintain a good reputation. Credence goods markets are characterized with information asymmetry about the value of sellers' services to consumers who must rely on sellers for diagnosis and treatment provision....

A decision maker offers a new product to a fixed number of adopters. The decision maker does not know the value of the product while adopters receive some private information about the value. We study how the decision maker may influence learning among adopters by manipulating the launch...