Using belief elicitation, the paper investigates the formation and the evolution of beliefs in a signalling game in … which a common prior on Sender's type is not induced. Beliefs are elicited about the type of the Sender and about the … strategies of the players. The experimental subjects often start with diffuse uniform beliefs and update them in view of …

to disagree forever. Although the learning process converges, leading to common knowledge of the individual decisions …

strategy relative to more traditional learning dynamics, and establish that, paradoxically, when sellers are strategic, the …

This paper experimentally investigates social learning in a two-agent prediction game with both exogenous and …. We find that more efficient observational learning leads to more accurate predictions in the endogenous treatments and … strength. Simultaneous decisions in endogenous ordering avoid observational learning and compensate the higher degree of …

not know about the information acquisition) or public (the opponent knows about the information acquisition) learning. We … show that a situation, when one player learns the type of the opponent privately while the opponent abstains from learning … cannot be an equilibrium. Yet, there exists an equilibrium, when one player engages in public learning and the other refrains …

-updated beliefs instead of their priors. Our proposed mistake predicts when individuals over- or underreact to new information …