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Fighting for lemons: the encouragement effect in dynamic contests with private information

Beccuti, Juan; Möller, Marc - 2020

This paper proposes a tractable model of a dynamic contest where players have private information about the contest's prize. We show that private information helps to encourage players who have fallen behind, leading to an increase in aggregate incentives. We derive the optimal information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012318681

Signaling in Dynamic Contests with Heterogenous Rivals

Catepillan, Jorge; Figueroa, Nicolas; Lemus, Jorge - 2022

We study signaling in dynamic contests with heterogeneous players. A privately-informed challenger faces a sequence of rivals of known types. The type of future rivals determines which signal the challenger wants to produce, whereas the strategic response of current rivals determines the extent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013292789

'Where Ignorance is Bliss, 'Tis Folly to Be Wise' : Transparency in Contests

Denter, Philipp; Morgan, John; Sisak, Dana - 2015

Disclosure of lobbying activity has become much more timely and stringent in the US, and many demand similar regulation … also for lobbying in the European Union. Disclosure informs voters about a lobbyist’s activity, but it also informs rival … lobbying groups, with strategic consequences. Under mild conditions, we show that mandatory real-time disclosure exacerbates …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014182377

Private-information group contests : best-shot competition

Barbieri, Stefano; Malueg, David A. - In: Games and economic behavior 98 (2016), pp. 219-234

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011771442

Rent-seeking group contests with one-sided private information

Everhardt, Rob J.; Schoonbeek, Lambert - In: Decisions in economics and finance : DEF ; a journal of … 38 (2015) 1, pp. 55-73

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010513462

Contests : a comparison of timing and information structures

Ludwig, Sandra - 2011

We study a model of imperfectly discriminating contests with two ex ante symmetric agents. We consider four institutional settings: Contestants move either sequentially or simultaneously and in addition their types are either public or private information. We find that an effort-maximizing...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009124645

Contributing or free-riding? : voluntary participation in a public good economy

Furusawa, Taiji; Konishi, Hideo - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 6 (2011) 2, pp. 219-256

We consider a (pure) public goods provision problem with voluntary participation in a quasi-linear economy. We propose a new hybrid solution concept, the free-riding-proof core (FRP-Core), which endogenously determines a contribution group, public goods provision level, and how to share the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011694996

Contests with linear externality in prizes

Park, Sung-Hoon; Lee, Sanghack - In: Seoul journal of economics 32 (2019) 3, pp. 323-336

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012123487

Equilibrium existence and expected payoffs in all-pay auctions with constraints

Pastine, Ivan; Pastine, Tuvana - In: Economic theory 75 (2023) 4, pp. 983-1007

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014259084

Kosher Pork

Drazen, Allan; Ilzetzki, Ethan - In: Journal of public economics 227 (2023), pp. 1-12

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014483842