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Interim information in long term contracts

Strausz, Roland - 2005

information alleviates the contracting problem only partially and its optimal use depends on the signal's accuracy and timing … principle, the optimal contract under non-verifiability is derived by employing the theory of communication equilibrium. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010343964

A theory of threshold contracts

Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans - 2013 - This version: August 2013

We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221102

Dynamic contracts when agent's quality is unknown

Prat, Julien; Jovanovic, Boyan - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 9 (2014) 3, pp. 865-914

We solve a long-term contracting problem with symmetric uncertainty about the agent's quality, and a hidden action of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011674079

Contracts that Reward Innovation : Delegated Experimentation with an Informed Principal

Sun, Yiman - 2018

uncertain about which contract will be implemented, can increase the payoff of the high type principal to approximate her full …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932065

Optimal Contracting with Endogenous Project Mission

Cassar, Lea - 2017

I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent's marginal return of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012966930

Contract Litigation as Information Revelation Channel and its Implications on Reputation (Dis)Incentives

Tzang, F.L. Philip - 2011

We examine how the reputation concern of contracting parties affects contractual incentives if information is … transmitted to the public through contract litigation. In a career concern framework, the performance of the long-lived seller is … additional legal cost which induces her to settle privately. A strong reputation concern effectively voids the incentive contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125615

Optimal contracting with endogenous project mission

Cassar, Lea - 2014

I present a model in which a principal selects one among many agents to develop a project and influences the agent's ex post level of effort not by outcome-contingent rewards, but by the choice of the project's mission. The closer the project's mission to the agent's preferred mission, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010359776

Optimal contracting with endogenous project mission

Cassar, Lea - 2016

I analyze a model in which a principal offers a contract to an agent and can influence the agent’s marginal return of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011561184

Optimal Contracting with Endogenous Project Mission

Cassar, Lea - 2016

Empirical evidence shows that workers care about the mission of their job in addition to their wage. This suggests that employers can use the job mission to incentivize and screen their workers. I analyze a model in which a principal selects one agent to develop a project and influences the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012986072

The provision of wage incentives : A structural estimation using contracts variation

D'Haultfœuille, Xavier; Février, Philippe - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 11 (2020) 1, pp. 349-397

, we exploit an exogenous change in the contract structure in 2003, the piece rate increasing from 20.2 to 22.9 euros. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012202372