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Lying about what you know or about what you do?

Serra-Garcia, Marta; Damme, Eric E. C. van; Potters, Jan - 2011 - rev.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009389588

Kellner, Christian; Thordal-Le Quement, Mark - 2013

We study cheap talk communication in a simple two actions-two states model featuring ambiguous priors. First, we find … mixing by respectively S or R as embodying two different modes of ambiguous communication. Second, we find that for … implement his optimal decision rule and influential communication may be altogether impossible. We remark that these results …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010211402

Lying about what you know or about what you do?

Serra-Garcia, Marta; Damme, Eric E. C. van; Potters, Jan - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 11 (2013) 5, pp. 1204-1229

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010342093

Long persuasion games

Forges, Françoise; Koessler, Frédéric - In: Journal of economic theory 143 (2008) 1, pp. 1-35

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003812133

Long persuasion games

Forges, Françoise (contributor); … - 2006

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003301085

Long persuasion games

Forges, Françoise (contributor); … - 2006

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003305022

Modes of ambiguous communication

Kellner, Christian; Thordal-Le Quement, Mark - In: Games and economic behavior 104 (2017), pp. 271-292

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011793365

Robustness of full revelation in multisender cheap talk

Meyer, Margaret A.; Moreno de Barreda, Inés; Nafziger, … - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 14 (2019) 4, pp. 1203-1235

This paper studies information transmission in a two-sender, multidimensional cheap talk setting where there are exogenous constraints on the (convex) feasible set of policies for the receiver and where the receiver is uncertain about both the directions and the magnitudes of the senders' bias...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012158784

Long Persuasion Games

Koessler, Frédéric - 2007

This paper characterizes geometrically the set of all Nash equilibrium payoffs achievable with unmediated communication …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778541

Strategic reasoning in persuasion games : an experiment

Li, Ying Xue; Schipper, Burkhard - 2018

We study experimentally persuasion games in which a sender (e.g., a seller) with private information provides verifiable but potentially vague information (e.g., about the quality of a product) to a receiver (e.g., a buyer). Various theoretical solution concepts such as sequential equilibrium or...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011811807