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Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - 2013

used as commitment devices when it is impossible to commit not to renegotiate them. We characterize renegotiation …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010222351

Becker, Johannes Gerd; Gersbach, Hans - 2013 - This version: August 2013

We consider an in nitely repeated reappointment game in a principal- agent relationship. Typical examples are voter-politician or government- public servant relationships. The agent chooses costly effort and enjoys being in office until he is deselected. The principal observes a noisy signal of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010221102

Contracts that Reward Innovation : Delegated Experimentation with an Informed Principal

Sun, Yiman - 2018

uncertain about which contract will be implemented, can increase the payoff of the high type principal to approximate her full …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012932065

Optimal contracting with altruism and reciprocity

Bassi, Matteo; Pagnozzi, Marco; Piccolo, Salvatore - In: Research in economics : an international review of economics 68 (2014) 1, pp. 27-38

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010465753

Commitment without reputation : renegotiation-proof contracts under asymmetric information

Gerratana, Emanuele; Koçkesen, Levent - In: Review of economic design : RED 19 (2015) 3, pp. 173-209

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011409065

Menuless and Preference-Free Screening Contracts for Fund Managers

He, Xue Dong; Hu, Sang; Kou, Steven - 2021

any manager who is unfavorable to some investors. The contract problem has hidden types, hidden actions, hidden knowledge …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013225865

Contract Litigation as Information Revelation Channel and its Implications on Reputation (Dis)Incentives

Tzang, F.L. Philip - 2011

transmitted to the public through contract litigation. In a career concern framework, the performance of the long-lived seller is … additional legal cost which induces her to settle privately. A strong reputation concern effectively voids the incentive contract …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013125615

Learning, termination, and payout policy in dynamic incentive contracts

DeMarzo, Peter M.; Sannikov, Yuliy - 2016

rents, reducing his incentives to exert effort. The optimal contract controls information rents to improve incentives by … reflects the agent's private ability, a simple equity contract is optimal …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011864825

The provision of wage incentives : A structural estimation using contracts variation

D'Haultfœuille, Xavier; Février, Philippe - In: Quantitative economics : QE ; journal of the … 11 (2020) 1, pp. 349-397

, we exploit an exogenous change in the contract structure in 2003, the piece rate increasing from 20.2 to 22.9 euros. We …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012202372

Implicit contracts, incentive compatibility, and involuntary unemployment : thirty years on

MacLeod, William Bentley; Malcomson, James M. - 2023

with reflections on the future of relational contract theory and practice. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013500553