We discuss a class of markets for durable goods where efficiency (or approximate efficiency) is obtained despite the presence of information asymmetries. In the model, the number of times a good has changed hands (the vintage of the good) is an accurate signal of its quality, each consumer...

Leasing contracts are extensively used in durable goods markets. These contracts specify a rental rate and an option price at which the used good can be bought at the termination of the lease. This option price cannot be controlled when the car is sold. We show that in a world where quality is...

This is an invited chapter for the forthcoming Volume 4 of the Handbook of Industrial Organization. We focus on markets with frictions, such as transaction costs, asymmetric information, search and matching frictions. We discuss how such frictions affect allocations, favor the emergence of...

I discuss the role of intermediaries that search out the information of privately informed parties and then choose what to reveal to uninformed parties. The focus is on the strategic manipulation of information by these certification intermediaries. I show that in a class of environments the...