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Intention or request : the impact of message structures

Wang, Siyu; Flannery, Timothy - In: Games 12 (2021) 1/12, pp. 1-13

their suggested actions more frequently with request than intention. We surmise lying aversion plays a prominent role in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432600

Eliciting private information with noise : the case of randomized response

Blume, Andreas; Lai, Ernest K.; Lim, Wooyoung - 2013

prediction, randomization significantly reduces the elicited information in our experiment. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010201201

The role of verifiability and privacy in the strategic provision of performance feedback : theory and experimental evidence

Ertac, Seda; Koçkesen, Levent; Özdemir, Duygu - 2015

feedback given to the other agent. We show that a model with individual-specific lying costs and naive agents can account for …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011389425

Disguising lies : image concerns and partial lying in cheating games

Khalmetski, Kiryl; Sliwka, Dirk - 2017

fixed cost of lying and image concerns not to be perceived as a liar. We show that equilibria naturally arise in which … agents with low costs of lying randomize among a set of the highest potential reports. Such equilibria induce a distribution … the range of reported lies while the effect of the fixed cost of lying is the opposite. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011603130

Communication-enhancing vagueness

Wood, Daniel H. - In: Games 13 (2022) 4, pp. 1-27

I experimentally investigate how vague language changes the nature of communication in a biased strategic information transmission game. Counterintuitively, when both precise and imprecise messages can be sent, in aggregate, senders are more accurate, and receivers trust them more than when only...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013367782

Implicit vs. explicit deception in ultimatum games with incomplete information

Kriss, Peter H.; Nagel, Rosemarie; Weber, Roberto A. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 93 (2013), pp. 337-346

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010198444

Malleable lies : communication and cooperation in a high stakes TV game show

Turmunkh, Uyanga; Assem, Martijn J. van den; Dolder, … - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 65 (2019) 10, pp. 4795-4812

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012118130

Cheating and loss aversion : do people lie more to avoid a loss?

Grolleau, Gilles; Kocher, Martin; Sutan, Angela - 2014

Does the extent of cheating depend on a proper reference point? We use a real effort task that implements a two (gain versus loss frame) times two (monitored performance versus unmonitored performance) between-subjects design to examine whether cheating is reference-dependent. Our experimental...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010412075

Do liars believe? : beliefs and other-regarding preferences in sender-receiver games

Sheremeta, Roman M.; Shields, Timothy W. - In: Journal of economic behavior & organization : JEBO 94 (2013), pp. 268-277

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010248983

Communicating deception : differences in language use, justifications, and questions for lies, omissions, and truths

Swol, Lyn M. van; Braun, Michael T. - In: Group decision and negotiation 23 (2014) 6, pp. 1343-1367

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010431387