We study an organization, consisting of a manager and a worker, whose success depends on its ability to estimate a payoff-relevant but unknown parameter. If the manager has private information about this parameter, she has an incentive to conceal it from the worker in order to motivate him to...

We examine optimal information flows between a manager and a worker who is in charge of evaluating a parameter of interest, e.g. the value of a project. The manager may possesses information about the parameter, and, if informed, may divulge her information to the worker. We show that...

This paper examines the impact of informational frictions when the entrepreneur anticipates having little or no bargaining power in negotiating with the financier and can select ex ante the innovation/venture he wants to develop. In this environment the entrepreneur faces a tradeoff between...

This paper examines the impact of informational frictions when the entrepreneur anticipates having little or no bargaining power in negotiating with the financier and can select ex ante the innovation/venture he wants to develop. In this environment the entrepreneur faces a tradeoff between...

This paper examines the impact of informational frictions when the entrepreneur anticipates having little or no bargaining power in negotiating with the financier and can select ex ante the innovation/venture he wants to develop. In this environment the entrepreneur faces a tradeoff between...