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Coalition formation for unpopular reform in the presence of private reputation costs

Winschel, Evguenia - 2012

This paper studies coalition formation under asymmetric information. An outside party offers private payments in order … information. The paper demonstrates that a supermajority coalition induces truth-telling and secures the implementation of the … decision for a price close to the full information minimal winning coalition price. On the contrary, if the minimal winning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011490230

A Full Characterization of Nash Implementation with Strategy Space Reduction

Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - 2011

Noting that a full characterization of Nash-implementation is given using a canonical-mechanism and Maskin's theorem (Maskin, 1999) is shown using a mechanism with Saijo's type of strategy space reduction (Saijo, 1988), this paper fully characterizes the class of Nash-implementable social choice...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014195916

Cheap Talk, Status Quo and Delegation

Sanyal, Amal; Sengupta, Kunal - 2008

The paper analyzes a communication game between a decision-maker and a reputationally concerned expert drawn from a population of informed and uninformed experts. It departs from the literature [e.g. (Ottaviani and Sorensen(2006), Scharfstein and Stein (1990)] by considering the possibility that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014220230

Chapter 59 Strategic aspects of political systems

Banks, Jeffrey S. - In: Handbook of game theory with economic applications : …, (pp. 2203-2228). 2002

Early results on the emptiness of the core and the majority-rule-chaos results led to the recognition of the importance of modeling institutional details in political processes. A sample of the literature on game-theoretic models of political phenomena that ensued is presented. In the case of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014024486

Treading a fine line : (im)possibilities for Nash implementation with partiallyhonest individuals

Lombardi, Michele; Yoshihara, Naoki - 2017

This paper investigates the robustness of Dutta and Sen's (2012) Theorem 1 to weaker notions of truth-telling. An individual honesty standard is modeled as a subgroup of the society, including the individual herself, for which she feels truth-telling concerns. An individual i is honest when she...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011599087

Modes of persuasion toward unanimous consent

Bardhi, Arjada; Guo, Yingni - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 13 (2018) 3, pp. 1111-1149

A fully committed sender seeks to sway a collective adoption decision through designing experiments. Voters have correlated payoff states and heterogeneous thresholds of doubt. We characterize the sender-optimal policy under unanimity rule for two persuasion modes. Under general persuasion,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011937302

Against all odds : tentative steps toward efficient information sharing in groups

Schlangenotto, Darius; Schnedler, Wendelin; Vadovič, … - In: Games 11 (2020) 3/31, pp. 1-24

When groups face difficult problems, the voices of experts may be lost in the noise of others' contributions. We present results from a "naturally noisy" setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the expert's voice was "lost" to such a degree that bringing forward even more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012432144

Implementation Theory with Incomplete Information

Allen, Beth Elaine - 2008

This paper surveys implementation theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially in economic environments. After the basic problem is introduced, the theory of implementation is summarized. Some coalitional considerations for implementation problems are discussed. For...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012770273

Against all odds: tentative steps toward efficient information sharing in groups

Schlangenotto, Darius; Schnedler, Wendelin; Vadovič, … - 2020

When groups face difficult problems, the voice of experts may be lost in the noise of others' contributions. We present results from a 'naturally noisy' setting, a large first-year undergraduate class, in which the 'expert's voice is lost' to such a degree that it is in fact optimal for all...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012257743

Organizing for Collective Action : Olson Revisited

Battaglini, Marco; Palfrey, Thomas R. - National Bureau of Economic Research - 2023

We study a standard collective action problem in which successful achievement of a group interest requires costly participation by some fraction of its members. How should we model the internal organization of these groups when there is asymmetric information about the preferences of their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014226188