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Matching for credit : identifying information asymmetries in joint-liability lending

Klein, Thilo - 2024

-liability (JL) to individual liabil- ity (IL) lending models. This article tests a theory explaining this shift, focusing on … borrowers matching into groups exposed to similar economic shocks under JL, diminishing its effectiveness. I reconcile …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015271329

Rigidity of Transfers and Unraveling in Matching Markets

Du, Songzi - 2015

We study the role of transfers in the timing of matching. In our model, some agents have the option of matching early … a stable matching after all agents arrive. We prove that without flexible transfers, as the market gets large, on … average at least one quarter of all agents in period 1 have strict incentives to match early and skip the centralized matching …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013036064

School choice with asymmetric information : priority design and the curse of acceptance

Kloosterman, Andrew; Troyan, Peter - In: Theoretical economics : TE ; an open access journal in … 15 (2020) 3, pp. 1095-1133

We generalize standard school choice models to allow for interdependent preferences and differentially-informed students. We show that in general, the commonly-used deferred acceptance mechanism is no longer strategy-proof, the outcome is not stable, and may make less informed students worse...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012309572

Informational hold up and intermediaries

Utgoff, Naomi - In: Games 13 (2022) 5, pp. 1-14

Why do some incomplete information markets feature intermediaries while others do not? I study the allocation of two goods in an incomplete information setting with a single principal, multiple agents with unit demand, and interdependent valuations. I construct a novel dynamic mechanism...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014418049

Targeted vs. Collective Information Sharing in Networks

Kushnir, Alexey - 2014

We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the optimal design of social networks like Facebook or Google. We distinguish between unilateral and bilateral connections and between targeted and collective information sharing....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013055757

Targeted vs. collective information sharing in networks

Kushnir, Alexey; Nichifor, Alexandru - 2014 - This version: April 4, 2014

We introduce a simple two-stage game of endogenous network formation and information sharing for reasoning about the optimal design of social networks like Facebook or Google+. We distinguish between unilateral and bilateral connections and between targeted and collective information sharing....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010360337

Optimal Dynamic Allocation : Simplicity through Information Design

Ashlagi, Itai - 2020

Myerson [1981] and Toikka [2011] and generalize it to the design of optimal steady-state matching mechanisms in a setting with …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012833053

Gatekeeping under Asymmetric Information

Muller-Itten, Michele - 2020

I model access to influence as a two-sided matching market between a continuum of experts and a finite number of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014092612

Self-confidence and unraveling in matching markets

Dargnies, Marie-Pierre; Hakimov, Rustamdjan; Kübler, … - 2019

We document experimentally how biased self-assessments affect the outcome of labor markets. In the experiments, we exogenously manipulate the self-confidence of participants in the role of workers regarding their relative performance by employing hard and easy real-effort tasks. Participants in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012138436

Employment Fluctuations with Downward Wage Rigidity : The Role of Moral Hazard

Costain, James - 2009

This paper studies the cyclical dynamics of Mortensen and Pissarides' (1994) model of job creation and destruction when workers' effort is not perfectly observable, as in Shapiro and Stiglitz (1984). An occasionally-binding no-shirking constraint truncates the real wage distribution from below,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013157042