How does investors' information about a country's fundamentals, and the fact that this information may be asymmetrically held, affect a country's financing cost? Motivated by this question, and by the observation that sovereign bonds are usually auctioned in large lots to a large number of...

Market inefficiency provides an opportunity for rational arbitrage. Nonetheless, investors may not necessarily act on such information even if they are informed. Instead, they extrapolate what the others are doing and decide strategically whether to do rational arbitrage or irrational...

I examine the possibility of information-based trading in a multiperiod consumption setting. I develop a necessary and sufficient condition for trade to occur. Intertemporal substitution introduces a desire to correlate current consumption with future aggregate shocks. When agents have...

We model the role of dealers in information diffusion in over-the-counter (OTC) markets. A dealer maintains relationships with a network of both informed customers who trade to profit from private information pertaining to asset values and risk-averse liquidity customers who trade to meet...

Sudden big price changes are followed by periods of high and persistent volatility. I develop a tractable dynamic rational expectations model consistent with this observation. An infinity of agents possess dispersed information about future dividends and trade in centralized markets. Information...

We propose a novel and tractable equilibrium model to study how information asymmetry, competition among market makers, and investors' risk aversion affect asset pricing, market illiquidity and welfare. The main innovation is that market makers compete through choosing simultaneously quantities...

We meticulously scrutinize the widely acknowledged measures of the Probability of Informed Trading (PIN) and the Volume-Synchronized Probability of Informed Trading (VPIN), initially posited by David Easley et al., which have achieved considerable eminence within the realm of financial academia....

The Kyle (1985) model is extended to take into account market maker competition and the spread. It is shown that with a spread the Kyle model has a Nash equilibrium also with two market makers, not only with three or more, as shown in earlier research. The spread is endogenized, and two testable...

Through extending a standard Grossman and Stiglitz (1980) noisy rational expectations economy by a heterogeneous signal structure with signal-specific differences in uncertainty, we show that price momentum as well as reversal are not intrinsically at odds with rational behavior. Differences in...

Market makers in some financial markets often make offsetting trades and have significant market power. We develop a market making model that captures these market features as well as other important characteristics such as information asymmetry and inventory risk. In contrast to the existing...