This paper conducts an empirical investigation of the relationship between information asymmetry and real activities manipulation. When information asymmetry is high, stakeholders do not have sufficient resource, incentives, or access to relevant information to monitor manager‘s actions, which...

The corporate information environment develops endogenously as a consequence of information asymmetries and agency problems between investors, entrepreneurs, and managers. We provide a framework for analyzing the three main decisions that shape the corporate information environment in a capital...

We provide a bridge between the voluntary disclosure and the earnings management literature. Voluntary disclosure models focus on managers' discretion in deciding whether or not to provide truthful voluntary disclosure to the capital market. Earnings management models, on the other hand,...

Activist short-sellers could play an information role in capital markets by disclosing informative short-theses, or, as many are concerned, a manipulation role by spreading misinformation. To shed light on this controversy, this paper focuses on a powerful setting where both roles are heightened...

We examine whether Basu's (1997) differential timeliness metric and the related C-Score metric are effective in detecting predictable differences in conservatism surrounding corrections of overstated earnings. Cross-sectional and time-series analyses, employing 2,132 firms making restatements...

We examine whether Basu's (1997) differential timeliness metric and the related C-Score metric are effective in detecting predictable differences in conservatism surrounding corrections of overstated earnings. Cross-sectional and time-series analyses, employing 2,132 firms making restatements...

This paper examines how the quality of firm information disclosure affects shareholders' use of dividends to mitigate agency problems. Managerial compensation is linked to firm value. However, because the manager and shareholders are asymmetrically informed, the manager can manipulate the firm's...

This paper investigates whether the decision to issue a management earnings forecast is related to information asymmetry in the market for the firm s stock and whether the forecasts reduce the asymmetry. Theoretical models hold that a portion of the bid-ask spread arises because of asymmetric...

Over the last thirty years, numerous parties have discussed whether CEOs and CFOs should certify the appropriateness of their financial statements. Despite the interest in this issue, there is limited empirical research on whether a voluntary disclosure system for CEO\CFO certifications provides...

This paper examines the impact of complex yet precise language, particularly financial jargon, on information dissemination and ultimately market efficiency. As a natural laboratory, we analyze the information exchanged during earnings conference calls, where we instrument jargon with the Plain...