This paper describes corporate investment and financing decisions when managers have inside information about the value of the firm's existing investment and growth opportunities, but cannot convey that information to investors. Capital markets are otherwise perfect and efficient. In these...

This paper develops a model to study how entrepreneurs and venture-capital investors deal with moral hazard, effort provision, asymmetric information and hold-up problems. We explore several financing scenarios, including first-best, monopolistic, syndicated and fully competitive financing. We...

Presents a model of the issue-invest decision that occurs in firms when the management of the firm has superior knowledge related to the investment. This decision arises when a firm has a valuable investment opportunity that it wishes to undertake and cannot fully disclose to investors, but must...

This paper describes corporate investment and financing decisions when managers have inside information about the value of the firm's existing investment and growth opportunities, but cannot convey that information to investors. Capital markets are otherwise perfect and efficient. In these...