This paper analyzes judicial self-interest and information asymmetries as two major components of the uncertainty, which can emerge in the process of litigation. Judicial self-interest is analyzed as a potential uncertainty-triggering factor as basic human desires such as opportunism and career...

In the article, we discuss the phenomenon of third-party financing of lawsuits, which has been subject to intense debate from a legal as well as from an economic point of view. Drawing on the examples of Germany, Australia, and the United States, we show in Part I that different legal systems...

Two risk-averse litigants with different subjective beliefs negotiate in the shadow of a pending trial. Through contingent contracts, the litigants can mitigate risk and/or speculate on the trial outcome. The opportunity for contingent contracting decreases the settlement rate and increases the...

We develop a model of individual prosecutors (and teams of prosecutors) to address the incentives for the suppression of exculpatory evidence. Our model assumes that each individual prosecutor trades off a desire for career advancement (by winning a case) and a disutility for knowingly...

We consider separately strategic entry and asymmetric information in the design of the settlement policy governing patent disputes, with a focus on Shapiro(2003)'s consumer protection rule. We show that, when a potential entrant strategically incurs an entry cost before engaging in a patent...