This paper discusses a selected literature on continuous-time option games models, providing new insights and extensions. The paper analyzes both symmetrical and asymmetrical duopoly under uncertainty, including issues like preemption, non-binding collusion, perfect-Nash equilibriums,...

We study a linear interaction model with asymmetric information. We first characterize the linear Bayes Nash equilibrium for a class of one dimensional signals. It is then shown that this class of one dimensional signals provide a comprehensive description of the first and second moments of the...

This paper studies strategic behavior in product markets with asymmetric information. A real options model is developed to investigate information revelation and signaling role capital structure. Information revelation is ensured through a learning mechanism that stems from the real options...

Although many signaling situations are best interpreted as repeated games, prior research often models them as one-shot games. We analyze a class of repeated signaling games in which the informed player's type is persistent and the history of actions is perfectly observable. In this context a...

We consider repeated games with private monitoring that are 'close' to repeated games with public/perfect monitoring. A private monitoring information structure is close to a public monitoring information structure when private signals can generate approximately the same distribution of the...

This article analyzes the role of information in building reputation in an investment/trust game. The model allows for information asymmetry in a finitely repeated sender-receiver game and solves for sequential equilibrium to show that if there are some trustworthy managers who always disclose...

Second price allpay auctions (wars of attritions) have an evolutionarily stable equilibrium in pure strategies if valuations are private information. I show that for any level of uncertainty there exists a pure deviation strategy close to the equilibrium strategy such that for some valuations...

We study games with almost perfect information and an infinite time horizon. In such games, at each stage, the players simultaneously choose actions from finite action sets, knowing the actions chosen at all previous stages. The payoff of each player is a function of all actions chosen during...

Many, if not most, personalistic dictatorships end up with a disastrous decision such as Hitler’s attack on the Soviet Union, Hirohito’s government launching a war against the United States, or Putin’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022. Even if the decision is not ultimately fatal for...

We study the profit-maximizing mechanism in bilateral trade with interdependent valuations. The seller privately observes the item's quality, while the buyer privately knows his type of valuation. The seller's valuation only depends on the quality, and the buyer's valuation depends on both the...