This is the Online Appendix to the paper "Supplier Encroachment Under Asymmetric Information."The paper "Supplier Encroachment Under Asymmetric Information" to which these Appendices apply is available at the following URL: "http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018432" http://ssrn.com/abstract=2018432

Based on a supply chain framework, we study the stocking decision of a downstream buyer who receives private demand information and has the incentive to influence her capital market valuation. We first characterize a market equilibrium under a general single contract offer. We show that the...

We investigate how supplier can use a quantity discount schedule to influence the stocking decisions of a downstream buyer that faces a single period of stochastic demand. In contrast to much of the work that has been done on single-period supply contracts, we assume that there are no...

We analyze a dynamic bargaining game in which a seller and a buyer negotiate over quantity and payment to trade for a product. Both firms are impatient, and they make alternating offers until an agreement is reached. The buyer is privately informed about his type, which can be high or low: the...

In practice, interest expense can account for a large proportion of firms' costs, while the interest rate is often influenced by a firm's market prospect. In the presence of information asymmetry, a firm may have an incentive to borrow a larger amount, thereby signaling a high prospect to the...