Similar Search Results

Can communication mitigate strategic delays in investment timing?

Mermer, Ayse; Onderstal, Sander; Sonnemans, Joep - 2022

investment timings. Players choose when to invest in a nonrival project with uncertain returns. The earliest investor bears the … costs of investment and all players learn whether the project is of good or bad quality. Informational externalities create … free-riding incentives resulting in strategic delays in investment timings. Our theoretical analysis suggests that …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013375345

Competition and cooperation in a PFF game theoretic model of electrical energy trade

Csercsik, Dávid - 2013

A cooperative game theoretic framework is introduced to study the behavior of cooperating and competing electrical energy providers considering price-preference rational consumers. We analyze the interactions of generators in an idealized environment described by a DC load flow model where the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009719691

Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Glycopantis, Dionysius; Muir, Allan; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - 2004

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001974022

After the Storm : Asymmetrical Information, Game Theory, and an Examination of the 'Minnesota Model' for National Regulation of Mortgage Brokers and Tomorrow's Predatory Lenders

Ireland, Mark - 2012

There is a general consensus that the root cause of the most recent turmoil in the domestic and global markets is due to a failure in our regulatory system. Yet, Congress has not supported comprehensive regulation related to the day-to-day activities of mortgage brokers and their relationship...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014199708

Cooperative Theory with Incomplete Information

Allen, Beth Elaine - 2008

This paper surveys cooperative game theory when players have incomplete or asymmetric information, especially when the TU and NTU games are derived from economic models. First some results relating balanced games and markets are summarized, including theorems guaranteeing that the core is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014214463

Learning and collusion in new markets with uncertain entry costs

Bloch, Francis; Fabrizi, Simona; Lippert, Steffen - 2011

of a new project and decide when to invest. We characterize the equilibrium of the investment timing game with private …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009409636

Non-implementation of rational expectations as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium

Glycopantis, Dionysius; Muir, Allan; Yannelis, Nicholas C. - 2004

We show that a rational expectations equilibrium need not be incentive compatible, need not be implementable as a perfect Bayesian equilibrium and may not be fully Pareto optimal, unless the utility functions are state independent. A comparison of rational expectations equilibria with core...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009728179

Communication, credible improvements and the core of an economy with asymmetric information

Volij, Oscar - 1997

We analyze an economy with asymmetric information and endogenize the possibilities for information transmission between members of a coalition. We then define a concept of the Core that takes into account these communication possibilities. The internal consistency of the improvements is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011504624

On Cheap Talk in Games

Li, Jia-wei - 2005

It has been proved in many studies that cheap talk has great influence on a players' choice of strategies. But the effect of cheap talk has still not been properly evaluated in game theory. Based on a novel game model with parameters denoting how one player cares for the other's payoff, we can...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014066084

Signaling, Screening, and Core Stability

Serrano, Roberto; Vohra, Rajiv; Kamishiro, Yusuke - 2022

This paper provides a noncooperative approach to core stability in an economy with incomplete information. The analysis covers general exchange economies, although our tightest results hold when effective coalitions consist of at most two players, as in matching. We study the perfect Bayesian...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013297636