This paper aims to study the impact of costly and private information acquisition in global games with applications in financial crisis (e.g. bank runs, currency crisis). While exogenous asymmetric information has been shown to select a unique equilibrium, we show that the endogenous costly...

We study how market structures, along with asymmetries in learning technologies, affect trade in a product market. In this market, a new product of unknown quality is introduced to challenge a pre-existing product of known quality. We show that market efficiency (the first-best) is achieved both...

This paper studies how public disclosure of past trade details affects price discovery dynamics under asymmetric information with heterogenous hedging motives. We model that an informed buyer (informed trader) sequentially trades with a series of uninformed sellers (hedgers). The informed buyer...

We develop a continuous-time model where a risk-neutral principal contracts with a CARA manager protected by limited liability to run a project. Its output can be increased by costly unobservable managerial effort, but it is liquidated if the manager quits. The manager can trade a market...