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We consider multiple-principal multiple-agent games of incomplete information. In this context, we identify a class of direct and incentive compatible mechanisms: each principal privately recommends to each agent to reveal her private information to the other principals, and each agent behaves...
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This note presents a counter-example to Theorems 3 and 4 in Peters (2003, J. Eco. Theory) and suggests that indifference of the single agent with respect to principals' offers plays an important role in the failure of the Revelation Principle in Common Agency games. In addition we provide a new...
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This paper examines the role of direct mechanisms in common agency games. We focus on pure strategies and deterministic contracts and show how the introduction of a separability condition on the preferences of the agent is sufficient for the Revelation Principle to hold in in this setting, when...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012735231
We study games in which several principals contract with several privately-informed agents. We show that enabling the principals to engage in contractible private disclosures { by sending private signals to the agents about how the mechanisms will respond to the agents' messages { can...
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We study the design of market information in competing-mechanism games. We identify a new dimension, private disclosures, whereby the principals asymmetrically inform the agents of how their mechanisms operate. We show that private disclosures have two important effects. First, they can raise a...
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